The Bureau of the Budget: its development as a tool of effective executive leadership. by Gilman, Donald E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1962-06
The Bureau of the Budget: its development as a tool
of effective executive leadership.
Gilman, Donald E.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11748

Library
u.s. naval postgraduate school
mont ' alifo




THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET-
ITS DEVELOPMENT AS A TOOL OF EFFECTIVE
EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP
by
Donald E. Oilman
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
19^6
United States Naval Academy
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the School of Government,
Business and International Affairs of The George faihlngton
University in partial satisfactions of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Business Administration
June 6, 1962
Thesis directed
Arlin Rex Johnson,
Professor of Business Administration
by
Ph.D.
NpS A£CHIV£
US. R . Hoot
MONTEREY, (

PREFACE
It appears that relatively few people are acquainted with
the many and varied functions performed by the Bureau of the Budget
outside of the role it plays in the formulation and execution of
the President's annual budget. The functions currently assigned
to the Bureau go well beyond the mere arithmetic and mechanics of
budget review. For the Bureau, solely and exclusively, forms the
principal instrument through which the President is able to coordi-
nate his many constitutional duties and, at the same time, obtain
coldly objective judgements about how best to discharge these
duties.
It Is the purpose of this paper to trace the development of
the Bureau of the Budget, by means of its various functions, from
its inception until the present time. No attempt will be made to
cover all the functions involved, as this would be a tremendous
undertaking, and is really beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
an attempt will be made to show how the so-called main functions
became part of the Bureau's workload, with particular emphasis on
the statutory and presidential authority involved.
At the same time, it becomes evident that the adoption of
a national budget system and the creation of the Bureau of the
Budget in 1921, significantly strengthened the position of the
President as the Chief Administrator of the Government.
ii
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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Need for Executive Leadership
1th the exception of the White House itself, the Bureau
of the Budget stands as the oldest, the largest, and most highly
organized of all the Executive Staff agencies in existence today.
While it has not always been as large, nor as nationally signifi-
cant, nor as indispensable to the President, the Bureau has a his-
tory as intriguing as the controller movement in American business
The Bureau of the Budget was created by section 207 of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.^- This act is considered a mile-
stone on the way to effective public administration and management
in the United States. It established a national budget system,
revolutionizing the entire process for formulating and executing
the financial program of the federal government. As the foundation
of budgetary planning and control, the act not only fostered
responsible determination of the government's financial require-
ments, but it also committed the executive branch to a higher
standard of administration in all of its activities.
The adoption of this important piece of legislation has
been universally hailed as one of the most far reaching steps taken
^U. S. Statutes, Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 . ^2 Stat.
20; 31 U.S.C. 1.

2toward strengthening the management responsibilities of the Chief
Executive. It came, however, only after more than a ha If-century
of agitation by students of government and private management who
had explored the need for placing the President more directly in
the channels of administration, that he might begin to operate
with real effectiveness as the chief administrator.
Even in the early days of the Constitution, and as late
as the turn of the century, the President assumed little responsi-
bility for framing the financial program of the federal government.
It seems the formulation and execution of the financial program
of the United States was left almost entirely to the individual
spending agencies. Departments tended to function as separate
principalities, each oblivious to other servicer and needs of the
government, each pressing its own special needs upon Congress.
3
More specifically, estimates of expenditures were submitted
dlreotly to Congress without presidential clearance, and without
review or coordination into a unified program. There was no
executive machinery to follow through to see that the programs were
properly executed. Under conditions such as these, it was vir-
tually impossible to set up standard work policies and practices,
with the result that inefficient organization and methods could not
be detected and remedied. The President, except in times of
national crises problems, had neither the time nor the means for
2Horace \: . 'Jilkie, "Legal Basis For Increased Activities
Of The Federal Budget Bureau," The George Washington L-w Review .
Vol. II (April, 19^3), pp. 265-2^6.
^Harold D. Smith, "The Bureau of the Budget," Public
Administration Review (Winter, 195D, p. 10?.

3making many decisions, or for resolving the numerous conflicts
which arise in such a large organization. It was impossible to
plan the work of the government systematically. Neither could the
President keep abreast of what was happening, as there was no
single agency for collecting necessary information. The result was
conflict, inefficiency, duplication, and irresponsibility.
Under these procedures, the President was often ignored;
he was a chief executive In name only, for he was without staff
aides to investigate, collect information, and assist him in the
performance of his executive duties. It appears that except in
times of national crises, the trend has always been in the
h
direction of weakening the position of the President.
The situation existing at the time was summed up very
adequately by Mr. Harold D. Smith, a former Director of the Bureau
of the Budget when he wrote:
If the President does not have the means to carry out
his executive functions, he becomes a chief of state
something like the Dalai Lama, a venerated ruler in whose
name all ministerial apt Ions are taken but who is carefully
shielded from reality.-'
Since for the most part the President found himself outside
the channels of administration in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, he indeed came fairly close to occupying the
same relative position as the Dalai Lama. Thus, the President
was forced to rely on exerting his influence mainly by exercisir
his political power rather than through actual direction of
departmental activities by virtue of his position as the chief
administrator.
^Ibld. -5lDid .

Events Leading to the Establishment of
the Bureau of the Budgeti
;.i v
Since budgets were of inconsequential proportions in the
nineteenth century, few thinking Americans interested themselves in
government management. In fact, from 1885 until 1893, receipts
exceeded expenditures. During these years an average surplus of 21
per cent was realized, reaching a high of 41 per cent in 1888.°
This was the period when the major financial problem faced by
Congress was the annual disposal of the surpluses received from ex-
cessive tariff revenues. Consequently, human nature being what it
is, little attention was given to the problem of improving manage-
ment control over expenditures.
The period of extreme laxity in federal finance and manage-
ment extended from about 1880 to 1909. The reasons for this
attitude become apparent when one considers the writings of James
Bryce* As he put it, in rather flowery language, in 1883;
Under the system of congressional finance here
described, America wastes millions annually. But
her wealth is so great, her revenue so elastic, that
she is not sensible of the loss. She has the glorious
privilege of youth, the privilege of committing errors
without suffering from their consequences."
Also:
. . . America lives in a world of her own . . .
Safe from attack, safe even from menace, she hears from
afar the war-ring cries on European races and faiths,
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States: 1789-1945 . 19^9, pp. 296-299.
'Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Viley
& Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 11.
8James Bryce, The American Commonwealth , Vol. I, (London:
Mac Millan & Co., 1891), p. 179.

5as the gods of Epicurus listened to the murmurs of the
unhappy earth spread out beneath their golden dwellings.^
The first serious studies of a national budget began to
appear after the turn of the century with the publication of
Eugene E. Agger's The Budget in the American Commonwealth . 1907,
and S. Gale Lourie's The Budget . 1912. This literature emphas-
ized the fact that the financial devices then in use as expendi-
ture controls for national government activities were actually
budgets. In another instance, President Lowell of Harvard pointed
out the extent to which the budget idea had in some European
countries helped a sound system of executive responsibility, but
he did not attempt forging effective remedies for the shortcomings
of business management in the national government.
These writings for the most part, it appears, went unheeded
by the general public. But when expenditures began to exceed
revenues, the budget idea took on a new and meaningful signifi-
cance, for the surpluses of President Cleveland.*? day were not as
" Ibid
, p. 303.
10Edward H. Hobbs, Behind The President (-.ashington, D. C.
:
Public Affairs Press, 195^), p. 22.
11The executive departments, in accordance with Section 3669
of the Revised Statutes, submitted "annual estimates for the
public service ... to Congress through the Secretary of the
Treasury," who had the duty of compiling appropriation requests
into a book of estimates. Under the Treasury's organic law of
1789, the Secretary was "to prepare and report estimates of the
public revenue, and the public expenditure." In 1800 an amending
statute instructed the Secretary "to digest, prepare, and lay
before Congress ... a report on the subject of finance containing
estimates of the public revenue and expenditures, and plans for
improving or increasing the revenues, from time to time, for the
purpose of giving information to Congress in adopting modes of
raising the money requisite to meeting the public expenditures."
12Hobbs, loc. cit.

6persistent after 109^. Out of the nineteen years from 189** to 1912,
there were eleven years In which deficits occurred. Federal expen-
ditures were running between |300 and .#00 million in the 1890' s.
By 1912, they were nearly ,r?00 million.^ -hen the national
government spent its first billion dollars in a single year, cries
against vjaste and poor business practices were heard. The movement
towards a national budget system and responsible government was
underway.
The beginning of executive leadership in the formulation
of a unified financial plan was found in Section 7 of the Sundry
Ik
GivVl Appropriations Act of 1909 . The Act required the President
to submit recommendations for a program to meet anticipated defi-
ciencies. About the same time the President began to instruct
department heads as to the general policy they should follow with
respect to their estimates of expenditures which were to be sub-
mitted to Congress. Also, in his report to Congress for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1909, the Secretary of the Treasury, Franklin
MacVeagh, repeatedly urged the adoption of an executive budget
system. ^ He traced the historical developments which had brought
the federal government to the point where the executive had little
or nothing to say about the revenues, and where the executive
estimates of expenditures were constructed more or less for
trading purposes with the appropriation committees.
13^U. S. Bureau of the Census, loc. clt.
"lbx U. S. Statutes, Sundry Civil Appropriations Act , 1909,
36 Stat. 9^5.
^U. S. Department of the Treasury, Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Treasury
.
June 30, 1909, p. k.

7On March 22, 1909* the Senate appointed a special committee
to investigate the deficits being experienced by the federal
government. This committee reported that:
. . . the application to the business of the government
of improvements in systems and methods similar to those
which have produced the high degree of business efficiency
in the great business corporations of the country will
result in the saving of many millions of dollars annually
and in a much higher degree of efficiency in the conduct
of the government business.^-"
The next step was taken by President Taft. In 1911 he
appointed a Commission on Economy and Efficiency to study the
administrative branch of the federal government in order to
ascertain what improvements could be made in its organization and
procedures. Upon appointment, the Commission set out to secure
information from federal departments and agencies in order to
classify financial data according to amounts expended, appropri-
ated, or estimated by organizational unit, by category of function
to be performed, by character of outlay, and by amounts expended,
appropriated, or estimated under each act of appropriation. Also
as a result of discussions with department heads and in consulta-
tion with the President, the Commission prepared a set of forms
to be used by departments in the submission of budgetary data.
The Commission also prepared an organizational chart of the federal
government activity and made numerous studies of overlapping and
duplicating operations within the government. It was the viewpoint
of the Commission that the most significant step which could be
1
A
Henry Jones Ford, The Cost of Our Ifetlonal Government .
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1910), p. 105, quoted in
Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1959), pp. 17-13.

8taken to Improve the organization and procedures of the government
was a revamping of the method for determining and providing for
the government's financial needs. To put it another way, the
Commission believed no worth-while and substantial improvements
in the conduct of the government could be effected without the
17
adoption of a national budget system. '
Although President Taft was in complete agreement with
the conclusions of the Commission and although he submitted a
budget for fiscal year 191^ modeled on its suggestions, political
differences frustrated his efforts to develop a coordinated budget
program. In spite of the fact that the work of the Commission on
Economy and Efficiency led to no immediate legislation, it had
tremendous value in the long-run. The prestige of the Commission
and its strong backing by the President made budgeting an issue of
national significance. It stimulated attention to budgetary reform
I p
in municipalities and in the states.
This stimulation appeared to pay off, for the movement
toward responsible budgeting had made considerable headway among
state and local governments before the stage appeared set for fed-
eral legislation. Ohio, in 1910, enacted the first state law
authorizing the governor to draft a budget for submission to the
legislature. Wisconsin and California, in 1911, provided for im-
provements in state financial procedure, which incorporated some of
the features of a budget system. Six states enacted budgetary laws
17Smith, op. clt. . p. 108.
lSBurkhead, op. clt. . pp. 19-21.

9in 1913. In 1916, Maryland adopted a thorough executive budget-
making system. After this, reform spread rapidly; by 1920, 44
states had adopted some form of improvement in budgeting, of which
twenty-three had provided for an executive budget. *9
The legislative deliberations which finally led up to the
passage of the Budget and Accounting Aot went on for several years.
They had their beginnings in a comprehensive plan for a national
budget system introduced in the House, in 1918, by Representative
Medill McCormick of Illinois. Under this plan the fiscal respon-
sibility of the House was to be concentrated in a single standing
committee instead of eight oomraittees, each working on a single seg-+
ment of the Treasury's "book of estimates."
Also, as the country emerged from \Torld War I with annual
expenditures and a national debt beyond all precedent, the convic-
tion had grown strong that a clean break with a weak fiscal proce-
dure was in order. It seemed that Congress was determined to seek !
new solution whose strength would lie in the manner in which it
worked. 2* Their sights set, Congress began approaching the subject
of revising and improving financial administration in a nonpartisan
spirit. The legislative debate boiled down more or less to matters
of a technical nature rather than to the issue of the desirability
of a national budget system. 22 One question which appeared to
^Frederick A. Cleveland and Arthur Eugene Buck, The Budget
and Responsible Government (New York: The Mac Lilian Company, 1920)
p. 124.
20U. S., Congress, House Document No. 1006 (1918) . 65th
Cong. , 2d Sess.
21
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the
Budget, Staff Orientation Manual . April 1958, p. 2.
22Hobbs, op. clt. . p. 26.
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remain unanswered at the time was whether or not an executive
budget system should be adopted.
The House Select Committee on the Budget appointed in 1919
reported favorably on an executive budget system. Opposition to
this type of budget system came from Congressional "die-hards"
such as Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon, who argued that,
. . • when Congress consents to the Executive making
the budget it will have surrendered the most important
part of a representative government, and put this country
back where it Mai when the shot at Lexington was heard
"round the world.
"
23
Fortunately, this kind of opposition appeared not to have
been taken very seriously, for the House of Representatives took
favorable action on the report of the Select Committee on October
21, 191?. The Senate completed its action on the measure in Hay
of 1920.
A presidential veto on this first enactment held up final
action until 1921, when President Harding signed the bill. Wilson
had not opposed the Iflu on principle, but he objected to the
provision which prevented the President from removing the
24Comptroller General, and yet permitted Congress to do so on the
basis of a concurrent resolution. Under the Act of 1921, the
President still may not remove the Comptroller General, but the
Congress must act by Joint Resolution, which require? the use of
the President's executive vebo. Thus, the President becomes at
least a partner in the dismissal.
-'Cleveland and Buck, o p. clt. . pp. 101-102.
2\z Stat. 20; 31 U.S.C. 1, Title III.

11
Establishment of the Eureau of the Budget
The bill, ivhich «aa finally approved by President Harding
on June 10, 1921, is known rr the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921. This Act made 3 number of Important changes in the financial
management of the federal government. The most significant Hal
the establishment of a national budget system by creating the
Bureau of the Budget in the Department of the Treasury, adminis-
tered by a Director responsible only tc the President. -^
Prior to the passage of the Act, it is interesting to note
that both the House Select Committee and its equivalent in the
Senate spent a great deal of time exploring the kind and scope of
activities envisaged for the Bureau of the Budget. A study of the
hearings reveals that much of the testimony looked far beyond the
consolidation aspects of the money items for the budget document.
Instead of regarding budgeting simply as a series of steps required
in framing a budget, committee witnesses related the entire budget
process to the general responsibility for administrative plannin
and management centered in the President. 2 ^
One of these witnesses, Dr. villiam P. 'illoughby,
Director of the Brookings Institute for Government Research,
suggested the value of centralized information when he told the
House Select Committee that the Budget Bureau,
. . . should know all about the Government, its
organization, activities, and methods. This mears that
it should be a central bureau that will keep fully informed
2^Ibid . Section 20?.
2
°Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its
Evolution and Present Role," The American Political Science Review
(August 19^5), p. 661.
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as to how the Government is organized, what are its activ-
ities, what are the methods that are employed in performir
those activities, what are the laws and regulations govern-
ing the various services in the performance of their duties,
and information of that kind. 2 '
Being so widely informed, the Budget Bureau would know of
good as well as bad administrative practices. It could:
1. Bring about a standardization of the most efficient
methods.
2. Unravel organizational knots.
3. Stimulate the development of management services within
the departments.
k. Secure understanding for the President's general program
and in turn find out whether or not these plans and projects, leg-
islative or administrative, actually conformed to the President's
policy. 28
Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Charles D.
Norton, a businessman who had helped President Taft organize the
Commission on Economy and Efficiency, testified:
It seems to me that the President would need in his
Staff some one who would be 3.n executive manager so to
speak. And in the same way each Cabinet officer might
well have what I have often heard them plead for, either
an undersecretary or administrative secretary, whatever
he might be colled, s sort of business aide to each
Secretary with whom the President's budget staff could
confer directly. Then the budget staff would not be put
in a position of spying upon Cabinet officers, but there
would be created a group of associates, partners, if you
please, whose particular duty was that of analysis and
balancing the various projects of the administration. "
2
'U. S., Congress, House, Select Committee, Hearings
.
Establishment of a National Budget System
.
66th Cong., 1st Sees.,
1919, p. 81.
28Marx, op. cit . t p. 662.
297House Select Committee Hearing, op. cit. , p. 179«
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As a result of such statements, the head of the Budget
Bureau was visualized, not as a diplomat or fixer, but as a fact-
minded staff officer of the President. In this regard, Repre-
sentative Garner of Texas described the Budget Director as a man
of power, whose power was derived directly from the President
himself. The new Director would be "the President's man." If the
President appoints a man with courage, a man who will do his duty,
he will be the second most important man in the executive depart-
30
ment of the government.-'
Being "the Presidents man," the Budget Director was
intended to have the President's ear. To enable the Budget
Director to speak for the President and to act with the President's
continuing support, close contact between the two would be indis-
pensable. Because of this feeling, Representative Good of Iowa,
Chairman of the House Select Committee and the man who probably
deserves much credit for making the Budget and Accounting Act what
it came to be, was not in favor of putting the Bureau in the
Treasury Department. However, he did not contest the point very
strongly, as he believed it made very little difference where the
Bureau was placed so long as the working relationship between the
31Director and the President was maintained.
In addition to Its budgetary functions,
The Bureau, when directed by the President, shall make
a detailed study of the departments and establishments for
the purpose of enabling the President to determine what
ohanges (with a view of securing greater economy and
efficiency in the conduct of the public service) should be
p. 6.
31
30^Bureau of the Budget, Staff Orientation Manual, op. clt. .
Ibid , p. ?.
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made in (1) the existing organization, activities, and
methods of business of such departments or establishments,
(2) the appropriations therefor, (3) the assignment of
particular activities to particular services, or (4) the
regrouping of services. The results of such study shall
be embodied in a report or reports to the President, who
may transmit to Congress such report or any part thereof
with his recommendation on the matters covered thereby. 32
While making the Budget Bureau an establishment of the
President operating under his constitutional power over the execu-
tive branch, the Act at the same time required the Bureau;
... at the request of any committee of either House
of Congress having jurisdiction over revenue or appro-
priations, furnish the committee such aid and information
as it may request. 33
In comparison with the legislation v.'hich it replaced, the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 stands out as the first signif-
icant and determined move toward executive reintegration. How
truly new it would be, how much of a system it would represent,
what results it would produce— these are questions that could
not be answered in statutory terms*
The following chapters attempt to answer these questions
by tracing the development of the Bureau of the Budget from its
inception to its present prominent role as the President's "right
arm." In this respect, it is the writers opinion that the conduct
of the Bureau in the "early years" was particularly important in
laying the ground work for its ultimate rise to pov?er.
3£ i+2 Stat. 20; 31 U.3.C. 1, Section 209.
33iMd . Section 212.

CHAPTER II
THE EARLY YEARS
Setting the Stage
The creation of the Bureau of the Budget by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 was a major step in the direction of effec-
tive management in the executive branch of the Government. It
placed upon the President responsibility for the preparation of a
comprehensive annual budget and recognized the need for Executive
discretion and leadership in preparing and submitting to the Con-
gress a program of Federal expenditures. At the same time it pro-
vided the President with one of the primary instruments needed for
effective over-all management of the executive establishment. The
Director of the Budget Bureau is appointed by the President and
reports directly to him. The Director is one of the few high-rank-
ing policy officials in the executive branch who does not require
confirmation by the Senate. It is interesting to note that the
Budget Director's salary indicates that he is below Cabinet rank. 2
The Bureau of the Budget was set up as an arm of the Presi-
dent for centralized fiscal management of the vast administrative
%. S. , Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government . 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, Doc. No. 11, p. 7.
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), p. 73.
15
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machine, thereby enabling hira to submit regularly to the Congress
a oomplete report on past activities and future programs for
approval. Through its control over budgeting, the Bureau is in a
key position to detect weaknesses in the organization and func-
tioning of the various departments and agencies and to make recom-
mendations to the President, the Congress, and the departments in
the interest of economy and efficiency.
The first Budget Director, Charles 3. Dawes, took office
on June 23 , 1921. ^ Prior to his Budget appointment, he had turned
down the post of Secretary of the Treasury offered him by Presi-
dent-elect Warren G. Harding. Nor did Dawes look forward to more
than one year of service to get the budget system started. However,
he was convinced that governmental economy and efficiency had
become a national issue pressing enough to require complete revi-
sion of the way in which administrative business was being carried
on. He felt that he could best achieve this as an assistant
secretary to the President, securing "by direction of the President"
the intalllgence application of executive pressure upon the busi-
ness administration. In this regard, he thought of his role as the
Budget Director as inaugurating a system of coordinating business
control over the various departments and independent establishments
of government which, for one hundred and thirty- two years, have
been almost decentralized.
^Dawes had been a highly successful Chicago banker before
the first World War. During and immediately after the war he
became one of the principal figures in procurement and supply
operations for the American Expeditionary Forces. He reached
general rank. When he came to the Budget Bureau he drew his initial
staff very largely from among his wartime associates.
h,
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the
Budget, Staff Orientation Manual , April 1953, p. 10.
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Concurrently, with the establishment of the Bureau, the
President announced his determination to assume his full responsi-
bility as the head of the government's business organization. He
directed the Bureau Direotor, in accordance with the provisions of
the budget law, immediately to advise him of any improvements in
existing methods which could be legally inaugurated by issuance of
Executive Orders.
*
Dawes assumed his duties as Budget Director with great
enthusiasm for the new system, a keen sense of historic importance
of getting the new procedures successfully applied and a strong
feeling of personal Identification. The new Director was determined
to give effect immediately to the central mandate of the Act by
establishing a firm presidential control over executive estimates
of financial requirements to conduct the Government's operations.
He went to great lengths to assert presidential discipline over the
executive departments In the formulation and presentation of the
executive budget.
In this connection, on June 23, 1921, just five days after
his appointment, Dawes addressed the entire Cabinet in the presence
of the President in order to explain his plans and statement of
principles for the operation of the Budget Bureau. Dawes's inten-
tions at this meeting are best expressed in his own words:
Having thus the approval of the President beforehand,
I knew I would have no trouble in the matter of a unanimous
acquiescence in them by the Cabinet; but the important
thing I wanted to do with the Cabinet was to create the
-'Charles 0. Dawes, The First Year of the Budget of the
United States (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1923), pp. 104-105.
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impression that helpfully and sympathetically—with common
sense and proper appreciation of the rights and sensibil-
ities of others on my part in their application by me,
these principles were to stand now and for all time as the
rock of the Budget system of the United States.
The entire Cabinet, however, believed in my Judgement,
that whatever rights were given me by the President, I
would not be timid about exeroising, and that was my
principal idea in meeting them. 6
The principles of which Dawes speaks are:
1. The Budget Bureau must be impartial, impersonal and
non-political.
2. The Director of the Budget in the matter of govern-
mental business administration has no responsibilities
under the law save for the administration of his own bureau.
He is simply an advisor of the President and Congress in
the matter of correcting business administration.
3. The Director of the Budget, In gathering information
for the use of the President, acts for the President, and
his calls upon the chiefs of bureaus and other adminis-
trative officers for purposes of consultation or information
take precedence over the Cabinet head of a department, or
any head of an independent organization.
4. The Budget representatives in each department,
being appointed by the Cabinet head, will present to the
Director of the Budget the views of the Cabinet head upon
the wisdom of conclusions drawn by the Director of the
Budget, for use of the Chief Executive and Congress; but,
as in the case of bureau chiefs and other officers, the
call of the Director of the Budget for their presence
and advice takes precedence over the Cabinet head.'
On June 29 , 1921, the day after his meeting with the
Cabinet, Dawes addressed the entire government administration at
a meeting held in the Auditorium of the Interior Department
Building. At this gathering, he formally published his Circular
No. 1. He made it clear to all present that the permanent success
of the Budget system in the United States depends upon his set of
6
Ibid , p. 3.
?U. S., Bureau of the Budget, Circular No. 1 . June 29, 192L
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principles—that they must be so firmly established both as con-
cepts and rules of action that they will never be questioned, for
Q
the Budget machinery must last as long as the republic.
The President was solidly behind the new Budget Director.
In fact, President Harding went so far as to threaten dismissal
of recalcitrant departmental officials who refused to comply with
the requests of the Bureau. ° The President also designated the
Cabinet Room in the White House as the meeting place between the
Budget Director and members of the Cabinet. This step helped
raise the standing of the Budget Director and made it easier to
reconoile conflicting notions of official propriety. 10 To further
his quest for Bureau prestige Dawes let it be known that;
. . . the Secretary of the Treasury walked upstairs to
my office . . . one of his subordinate bureau chiefs . . .
because he regarded it as necessary in connection with a
call from me for information needed by the President of the
United States. That will be a historic walk in the annals
of the Budget Bureau. *•*
In carrying out the duties of his office, Dawes placed
more emphasis on the task of working out the technical aspects of
the new budget system, x«Jith related economies, than of attaining
economy and efficiency by detailed studies. He felt that thi r -
aspect of his duties was more important at the time, and he did
not want to over-extend his newly formed organization. Also, there
o
Dawes, op. clt. , p. 8.
^Harold D. Smith, "The Bureau of the Budget," Public
Administration Review , : .'inter, 19^1, p. 109.
10Bureau of the Budget, Staff Orientation Manual , op. cit. .
p. 12.
-^Dawes, on. clt. . p. 14.

20
were several committees at the time investigating reorganization
in government, and he did not want to cause embarrassment by over-
lapping or duplicating the work of these committees. ** Therefore,
much of his attention was focused on the creation of mechanisms,
such as the Federal Coordinating Service, the Government Business
Organization, and Federal business associations designed to intro-
duce the best business practices into governmental routine where
operating economies could be obtained. Dawes appears to have seen
himself as the business manager of the executive branch, in an
almost literal sense. There was no indication that he visualized
a policy focus for the budget system. -^
In fact, during his tenure of office, Dawes was very
emphatic concerning matters of policy in relation to the business
functioning of the Bureau.
I want to say here again that the Budget Bureau keeps
humble, and if it ever becomes obsessed with the idea
that It has any work except to save money and improve
efficiency in routine business it will cease to be useful
in the hands of the President. Again T say, we have
nothing to do with policy.^
The work of Dawes and his associates during the first year
of the Bureau proved heartening to those seeking greater economy
and efficiency. Congress was relieved of many duties as fewer
changes in proposed budgets and appropriations became necessary.
However, one must not overlook the fact that Director Dawes did
12Fritz Korstein Marx, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its
Evolution and Present Role," The American Political Science Review .
August 19^5, p. 6?1.
•^Richard Elliott Neustadt, "Presidential Clearance of
Legislation," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political
Economy and Government, Harvard, June, 1950), p. 18.
%awes, op. clt. . p. 173.
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not fulfill one of his principal functions as laid down by the
budget law, that of making detailed studies in order to secure
greater economy and efficiency. It is now generally recognized
that a greater variety of services would have been possible if
there had been less emphasis on the economy aspects of setting up
the new Bureau. A little more money for the Bureau would have
gone a long way. This economy trend for the Bureau established by
Dawes seems to hi>ve spilled over into the ensuing years. From
1921 until 1933 the average personnel strength ranged from 38 to
*+2, a number patently insufficient to exercise all of the respon-
sibilities spelled out in the Budget and Accounting Act.-1-*
Decade of Conservatism
General Dawes served the Bureau for only one year, but
left behind him a going concern of recognized standing and
integrity. He not only proved the value of the Budget Bureau as
a staff agency, but had also shown that the application of execu-
tive pressure for better administration was able to achieve
results. However, as was indicated earlier, the broader aspects
of executive management had. not received the attention they
required.
Dawes was succeeded subsequently by General Herbert W.
Lord (July l, 1922 - May 21, 1929), and Lieutenant Colonel J.
Clawson Hoop (August 15, 1929 - March 5, 1933). Both of these
men were associated with Dawes during World War I. They
^Edward H. Hobbs, Behind The President . (Washington,
D. C.J Public Affairs Press , 195^)
,
p. 28.
l6Ibid, p. 29.
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frequently consulted with Dawes and appeared to be more anxious
to preserve what they inherited than to reach aggressively beyond
it. However, both did yeoman's service in safeguarding the
Bureau's authority in the face of counter pressures and in keepln
their organization active and intact. 1 '?'
The Bureau's working approach became fairly well defined
during this period, and it came to operate increasingly on the
basis of settled routines. The indefinite postponement of admin-
istrative reorganization and the Bureau's pride in its small size
combined to deprive it of opportunities for self-development on
any significant scale. During its course of normal business
routine, the Bureau required a continually decreasing degree of
effective executive pressure. As a result, the art of applying
this pressure with Dawes's skill was lost. Independence began to
spring up in the departments again. Although the Bureau managed
to hold its ground, it could no longer afford a headlong collision
with departmental leadership. At the end of its first decade,
the Bureau was no longer able to shov; effective leadership.™ The
stage so painstakingly set by Dawes had now become obscure in the
twilight of routine.
Transfer to the Executive Office
of the President
When the Presidency was reactivated after the election of
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, the Bureau suddenly took on new
1
'Bureau of the Budget, Staff Orientation Manual, op. clt. .
p. 16.
l8Ibid.
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life. With the New Deal and the marked growth of governmental
activities, the President's need for greater staff assistance in
directing and coordinating the executive branch became more
Imperative.
The President in 1933 was given the power to reorganize
the Executive Branch of the government and to transfer or abolish
the functions of any executive agency.** Using this authority,
the President abolished the Coordinating Service and certain of
its functions were assumed by the Bureau of the Budget. 20
The President further strengthened his authority over
budget execution by transferring the authority to make, waive, and
modify appointments of appropriations from the heads of the depart-
ments and independent establishments to the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget. 2 ^ This authority gave the President greater con-
trols over expenditures of appropriated funds and orovided a means
for effecting economies in the government*
However, with expansion of the federal government's
activities and the corresponding increase in the complexity of
government organisation, the effectiveness of the efforts of the
executive branch was diminished to the point that both Congress
19Tltle IV of the act of June 30, 1932 (4-7 Stat. 413),
generally known as the Economy Act, gave the President the power
to reorganize, by transfer or consolidation, the functions of
executive departments and agencies. The power conferred did not
include authority to abolish any function. This act was amended
by the act of March 3, 1933 W Stat. 1517), vesting in the
President the power to abolish as well as to consolidate or trans-
fer functions of any executive agencies in order to reduce
Government expenditures.
20U. S., Executive Office of the President, Executive
Order No. 6166, June 10, 1933.
21Ibld.

24
and the President directed studies to be made. The object of these
studies was to develop a program for Improving the organization
structure and administrative management of the government. 22
On February 24, 1936, as a result of a resolution intro-
duced by Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, a Senate Select
Committee was appointed to investigate the executive agencies of
the government. The Senate Select Committee obtained the aid of
the Brookings Institute for the conduct of the investigation and
preparation of related reports, in conjunction with the President's
Co rjiittee on Administrative Ma na cement. 23
The Committee on Administrative Management was created on
March 22, 1936 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. This committee
became known M the "Brownlow Committee," because of its chairman
Louis Brownlow. The Committee was to study the organization of
the administrative departments and agencies of the government,
with the primary purpose of considering the problems of adrainis-
trative management. 2
Both of these committees stressed the management respon-
sibilities of the President and recommended that the Bureau of
the Budget be greatly strengthened and transferred to the immed-
iate staff of the President. The committees were also impressed
"Horace ". * lkie, "Legal Basis for Increased Activities
of the Federal Budget Bureau," The George 'ashlnqton r,aw Review ,
April 1943, p. 274.
-^U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Financial Management In the Federal Government . 87th
Cong* | 1st Sess., 1961, Doc. No. 11, p. 18.
2
^Ibid. p. 13.
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by the fact that the Bureau, in Its endeavor to set an example of
eoonomy, had restricted its staff to the point that the Bureau was
relatively ineffective, at least when compared with its poten-
tialities. 25
Although Reorganization Acts were proposed in both 1937
and 1933, it T'jas not until the following year, that the Reorgan-
ization Act of 19392" was passed. This Act required the President,
subject to the approval of Congress, to undertake the reorganiza-
tion of the Executive Branch of the federal government. The
President immediately submitted his first reorganization plan to
Congress. This plan provided, among other things, for the transfer
of the Bureau of the Budget to the Executive Office of the
President. In transmitting this plan, the President re-emphaslzed
the necessity for the Chief Executive to have direct control over
the managerial functions by which an executive can control his
organization, especially budgeting, efficiency, research, planning,
and personnel. with Congressional approval, the Bureau of the
Budget was made part of the Executive Office of the President
effective July 1, 1939- 2 ? Thus, the President was given the
machinery to enable him to carry out more expeditiously his con-
stitutional responsibilities as chief administrator.
Shortly after the creation of the Executive Office of the
President, its internal structure and the activities of its
several parts were defined in Executive Order No. 8243 of
2
^Wilkie, loc. clt.
2653 Stat. 561 (1939).
27Wilkie, op. clt. . p. 275.
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September 8, 1939. This order provided an enumeration of the
Bureau's main functions whioh are contained in Appendix A. In a
general way, these functions can be grouped under five headings:
(1) preparation and execution of the budget; (2) improvement of
government organization and management; (3) improvement of account-
ing and other phases of financial management; (4) legislative
analysis and review; and (5) coordination and improvement of
federal statistics.
The Bureau of the Budget as a management arm of the Chief
Executive was greatly strengthened when it was transferred to the
Executive Office of the President. In its new location, the
Bureau was made more accessible to the President. Furthermore,
the grouping of the several managerial agencies within the Execu-
tive Office resulted in a closer working relationship among the
immediate staff of the President.
In the next section of this paper an attempt will be made
to trace the development of the main functions of the Bureau of
the Budget with particular emphasis on the statutory aspects
involved.

CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF FUNCTIONS
Preparation and Execution
of the Budget
In the discussion of this phase of the Bureau's functions,
no attempt will be made to cover all of the facets involved. The
details of the modifications and improvements made throughout the
years are believed to be beyond the scope of this paper. Rather,
an attempt will be made to trace the legal basis for the develop-
ment of this function within the Bureau of the Budget, Also, the
starting point for discussion will be the creation of the Budget
Bureau, as Chapter I covered, for the most part, the situation as
it existed prior to the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921.
The task of assisting the President in the formulation of
his budget program is the most important single activity of the
Bureau of the Budget. In order to fulfill this function the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921 empowers the Bureau of the Budget,
. . . under such rules and regulations as the President
may prescribe, shall prepare the Budget, and any proposed
supplemental or deficiency appropriations, and to this
end shall hove authority to assemble, correlate, revise,
reduce, or Increase the requests for appropriations of
the several departments or establishments.
^
1Sectlon 207, hZ Stat. 20.
27
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This authorization apparently has "been interpreted
literally, in order, perhaps, to avoid constitutional objections.
The power to assemble, correlate, revise, reduce, or increase
estimates applies only to "the several departments or establish-
ments" and not to the Supreme Court of the United States or to
the legislative branoh. Estimates covering these components of
the government are Incorporated into the budget without modifi-
cation by the Bureau. 2
Control in the execution of the government's budgetary and
financial programs is based on the provisions of section 3679 of
the Revised Statutes as amended. This law is commonly referred
to as the Anti-Deficiency Act. The original section 3679*
Revised Statutes, was derived from legislation enacted in 1870,
and was designed solely to prevent expenditures in excess of
amounts requested. 3 in 1905 and 1906, section 3679 of the Revised
Statutes was amended to provide specific prohibitions regarding
the obligation of appropriations. The amendment also required
that certain types of appropriations be so apportioned over a
fiscal year as to prevent the expenditures in one part of the year
which would necessitate a deficiency or an additional appropria-
tion to complete the program of the fiscal year for which the
original appropriations were made. The authority to make, waive,
or modify apportionments was vested in the head of the department
or agency concerned.
p
Edward H. Hobbs , Behind The President (Washington, D. C:
Public Affairs Press, 1954T, p. 44.
^Section 7, 16 Stat. 251.
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On June 10, 1933, as a result of Executive Order 6166, the
authority to make, waive, and modify aoportionments of appropria-
tions was transferred from the heads of the departments and inde-
pendent establishments to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
This order was issued by President Roosevelt pursuant to the
h.
authority contained in the Economy Act of 1932, as amended in
1933. This Act vested in the President the power to abolish,
consolidate or transfer functions of any executive agency in order
to reduce government expenditures.
An amplified restatement of the Anti-Deficiency Act was
provided by Congress in the Appropriations Act of 1951» Among
other things, this restatement of the law integrated the provisions
of existing related legislation and executive orders. It also
expanded the scope of the apportionment, one of the most notable
being that the apportioning officers were to establish reserves
for contingencies in order to effect savings or to provide for
changes in requirements. In 1956, the Anti-Deficiency Act was
again amended to provide that each department or agency work toward
the objective of financing each operating unit at the highest
practical level, from not more than one administrative subdivision
of each appropriation in order to simplify the control system.
The revised Anti-Deficiency Act serves as the primary foundation
for the government's administrative oontrol of funds systems. The
H? Stat. 413.
%1 Stat. 1517.
Alfred H. Teichler et al. . "Administrative Control of
Funds - The Anti-Deficiency Story" (unpublished Group research
project, Navy Graduate Financial Management Program, George
Washington University, 1962), pp. 9-13.
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Bureau of the Budget sits at the pinnacle of these systems. This
position, that of enforcing reserves and impounding agency funds,
is one of the most controversial of all the functions of the Bureau.
?fore will be said regarding this in Chapter IV.
Prior to 19^5 i there existed a lack of control over
government corporations. In 1927 a Supreme Court decision held
that government corporations in certain respects were free from
accountability to the Department of the Treasury and from audit
jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office. In addition, the
Court held that the corporations were generally free of congres-
sional control over their expenditures for administrative and
operating expenses.'
Growing concern by the public and the Congress over the
number of government corporations and the need, for closer scrutiny
and independent audit of their operations so that Congress could
effectively discharge its responsibility over these corporations
led to a two year study of the problem by the Joint Committee on
Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures. The committee
issued a report on August 1, 19^, in which it was recommended
that government corporations be brought under closer fiscal
o
supervision.
In relation to the recommendation by the Joint Committee
on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures, two pieces of
legislation were passed by the Congress, one in 19^5 and the other
in 19^6. It is the former piece of legislation which primarily
7
'U. 5., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government . 87th
Cong., 1st Sees., 1961, Doc. No. 11, pp. 21-22.
8 Ibid.
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concerns the Bureau of the Budget. This law, known as the Govern-
ment Corporation Control Act,^ was approved on December 6, 19^5.
The major features in regard to the Budget Bureau provides that,
Each wholly owned Government corporation shall cause
to be prepared annually a business-type budget which
shall be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, under
such rules and regulations as the President may establish
as to the date of submission, the form and content, the
classifications of data, and the manner in which such
budget program shall be prepared and presented. ^
Also,
whenever it is deemed by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, with the approval of the President, to
be practicable and in the public interest that any wholly
owned Government corporation be treated with respect to
its appropriations, expenditures, receipts, accounting,
and other fiscal matters as if it were a Government agency
other than a corporation, the Director shall include in
connection with the budget program of such corporation
in the Budget a recommendation to that effect. 1
The first Hoover Commission report 1 on budgeting and
accounting submitted to Congress in February 19^9i contained 13
recommendations on budgeting, improvements in the operation of
the Bureau of the Budget, and reorganization of accounting proce-
dures and methods. To improve the government's budget process,
the Commission recommended the use of performance budgets, a
survey of the appropriation structure to correct diversity of
appropriations, separation of current expenditures from capital
outlays in agency budget estimates and clarification of the author-
ity of the President to spend less than amounts appropriated if
959 Stat. 597.
10Ibld . Section 102.
1:LIbid . Section 107.
l?U. S. , Congress, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, Report. Budgeting and
Accounting , 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 19^9.
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congressional purposes are carried out.
Based on the recommendations of the first Hoover Commis-
sion, Congress enacted the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act
of 195^. This Act is considered as the mot t progressive step
forward in the improvement of the financial system of the federal
government since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.^ The Act
explicitly recognized the President's authority to determine the
content, order, and arrangement of the proposed appropriations and
statements of expenditure in the budget. It pointed the presen-
tation of financial needs in the budget toward the activities to
be performed by the federal agencies, i.e., performance budgets.
It also lent special support to the improvement of government
accounting and auditing procedures in the interest of better finan-
cial management.
The second Hoover Commission report1 * on budgeting and
accounting was submitted to Congress in June of 1955. It con-
tained 25 recommendations for budgeting, accounting and auditing
practices, financial and performance reports, financial organiza-
tion, and related matters. The report also proposed the expansion
of the Bureau of the Budget and the creation of an Office of
Accounting in order to enable more effective discharge of the
Bureau's managerial, budget, and accounting functions, on the
13 6k Stat. 832.
•*•
^Financial Management in the Federal Government , op. clt. .
p. 63.
^U. S., Congress, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, Report. Budgeting and
Accounting , 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1955.
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premise that the strengthening of the Bureau of the Budget has a
direct bearing on leadership within the Executive branch.
There were several pieces of legislation enacted by the
Congress implementing the second Hoover Commission's recommenda-
tions. The most important insofar as the Bureau of the Budget
was concerned, is Public Law 84-863 $ approved August 1, 1956.
This law amended the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. Mainly, it provided
for the use of costs in budgeting <^nd accounting in the executive
agencies, the improvement of agency allotment practices, and the
development of consistency in financial and organization
classifications.
In summary, the Bureau of the Budget derives the powers
it exercises in carrying out the function of preparation and
execution of the budget, for the most part, from statutory
authority. The most important items of legislation which dele-
gates this authority to the Bureau of the Budget are:
1. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.
2. Government Corporation Control Act of 19^5.
3. Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950.
4. The Act of August 1, 1956.
5. Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes (Anti-Deficiency
Act)
.
The majority of tasks related to the Bureau's function of
preparation and execution of the federal budget are carried out
l670 Stat. 782.
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in the Office of Budget Review in coordination with the five
divisions of the Bureau. Generally, the Office of Budget Review
develops budget procedures; prepares fiscal analyses and reviews;
plans and schedules the estimates process; coordinates the review
of annual and supplemental estimates; prepares the budget document
and related items; drafts materials for the President's Budget
Message; and maintains liaison with the Appropriations Committees,
the Joint Economic Committee and the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, and those executive agencies primarily concerned
with economic and fiscal policy.
Improvement of Government Organization
and Management
The organic Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 specifically
charged the Bureau of the Budget with the duty of making studies
leading toward greater economy and efficiency in the conduct of
the government's affairs by improving upon organization, proce-
17dures, and administrative practices. Although the Bureau was
active from the start in the development of an improved system
for preparing the budget, it was not until the Bureau was made
part of the Executive Office of the President in 1939, that it
proceeded full steam ahead with its responsibilities in the field
of administrative management* Prior to 1939 » the Bureau had been
unable to give much attention to such problems. This condition
Supra, pp. 15-16.
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was partly due to the fact that the Bureau of Efficiency1" had been
engaged in activities of a similar nature until it was abolished
in 1933* But it was due principally to the fact that the Bureau
of the Budget, in order to impress upon the departments the
importance of economy, kept its own appropriations at an austere
level. 19
Although the functions of the Bureau of Efficiency were
transferred to the Bureau of the Budget in 1933 » management
improvement activities remained dormant until the results of the
Brownlow Report were made known in 1937.
The administrative research function placed upon
the Bureau are practically undeveloped; it la in this
respect that the Bureau has missed its greatest
opportunity. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
specifically authorized the Bureau to make detailed
studies of the administrative departments and establish-
ments for the purpose of advising the President intelli-
gently as to changes that should be made in their organi-
zation and methods, in the grouping of services, and in
the approoriatlons for various activities. The Bureau of
Efficiency was abolished by an act of Congress, approved
March 3> 1933* mainly on the grounds that it duplicated
work that the law required the Bureau of the Budget to do.
Its records and files were transferred to the Bureau of
the Budget, but adequate provisions for carrying on its
i ft1 The origin of the Bureau of Efficiency dates back to the
Legislative, Executive and Judicial Appropriation Act of 1913
>
(37 Stat. 360), which ordered the Civil Service Commission to
establish a system of employee efficiency ratings. The Commission
established a Division of Efficiency to handle this and relating
assignments. In 1917 as a result of the Urgent Deficiency
Appropriation Act (39 Stat. 14, 15) the Division was made inde-
pendent as the Bureau of Efficiency. In a report to Congress
(S. Doc. 5^, 73rd Con-., 1933 ) * it was noted that the Bureau of
Efficiency was created to provide a small force of specialists to
serve the President and the heads of agencies by studying specific
organization and procedural problems and by developing recommenda-
tions for improvements. The Bureau of Efficiency was abolished
in 1933 (^7 Stat. 1519) and its files and records were transferred
to the Bureau of the Budget.
19Supra « p. 29.
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worth are still to be made. Research In administrative
organization has been negligible* Recommendations for
reorganization have been conspicuously absent. 2°
It was also recognized that the importance of the manage-
ment research function of the Bureau of the Budget cannot be over-
estimated, for it is only when considered with reference to their
organization and procedural implications that the financial pro-
grams of the government agencies can be thoroughly understood.
Furthermore, there is always the problem of eliminating duplication
and overlapping of functions between agencies. Therefore, in the
Interests of the most economical and efficient management, it is
essential that a continuous study be made of management methods
both within and among the several agencies. This was, and still
is, regarded as an integral part of the budget function in that
it is inexorably associated with the problems of budget prepara-
tion, budget execution and the effective management of government
affairs. 21
A division of Administrative Management was finally set
up in the Bureau in 1939 » for the purpose of achieving greater
"economy and efficiency" in the government as indicated by the
Budget Act of 1921. One of the foremost responsibilities of the
Bureau with respect to administrative management was the task of
assisting the President in the preparation of the reorganization
2?plans submitted under the Reorganization Act of 1939.
U. 3., President, Committee on Administrative
Management, Report
. 193 7 > pp. 16-17,
"•Horace .'. '/llkie, "Legal Basis For Increased Activities
Of The Federal Budget Bureau," The George Washington Law Review .
April 19^3, p. 292.
22
53 Stat. 1^23.

37
Under Executive Order 3248 issued September 8, 1939, the
Bureau was specifically charged with the responsibility to "conduct
research in the development of improved plans of administrative
management, and to advise the executive departments and agencies
of the government with respect to improved administrative organ-
ization and practices," and to "aid the President to brin^: about
more efficient and economical conduct of Government service."
Title X of the Classification Act of 19^9, as amended, 2^
gave further authority to the Bureau of the Budget with respect
to management Improvement plans. Section 1D01 of this Act states,
In accordance with regulations issued and administered
by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, each depart-
ment shall make systemic reviews of the operations of each
of its activities, functions, or organization units, on
a continuing basis.
As a result of recommendations submitted by the first
oh.
Hoover Commission, in regard to improvement of organization and
management, the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1953
gave additional statutory authority to the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget. Under Section 103 of this Act, the President,
through the Director of the Budget Bureau was authorized and
directed to evaluate and develop improved plans for the organiza-
tion, coordination, and management of the executive branch of the
government.
In addition to the statutory authority granted the Bureau
of the Budget, in order to fulfill its function in regard to
2363 Stat. 95^.
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Report . 19^9, op. cit., pp. 26-28.
2$6k Stat. 832.
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Improvement of government organization and management, several
executive orders were also issued based for the most part on
Presidential authority. Executive Order 10072 of July 29, 19^9,
provides for continuing action to improve the management of the
executive branch, and requires the Director to assist agencies in
planning such programs and to review their efforts. Another
example is Executive Order 10559 issued September 8, 195^, which
delegates to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the
President's authority to allocate to agencies funds appropriated
to the President for management improvement.
In summary, the basic statutory authority which delegates
to the Bureau the means to fulfill its function In the field of
improvement of organization and management in the federal govern-
ment are:
1. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.
2. Reorganization Act of 1939*
3. Title X of the Classification Act of 19^+9.
4. The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1953.
The objectives of the Office of Management and Organiza-
tion are generally to improve government organization; to
strengthen and improve the internal management of individual
federal agencies; and to develop and Install improved standard
operating procedures for the government as a whole. More specif-
ically, the Office plans for the most effective distribution of
functions among end within federal agencies; it prepares reorgan-
ization plans for the President; it promotes and participates in
improved methods and practices where government-wide uniformity
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is desirable; it assists individual departments and agencies in
providing for continuous appraisal and improvement of their
management; and it advises on the organization and management
aspects of proposed legislation and executive orders.
Improvement of Accounting and Other
Phases of Financial Management
Under section 304 of the organic Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921, all the powers and duties which had been previously
imposed by law and exercised by the Treasury Department relating
to auditing and accounting were transferred to the General
Accounting Office under the Comptroller General of the United
States. Also, section 309 of the Act gave the Comptroller
General the power to prescribe forms, systems, and procedures for
the administrative appropriations and fund accounting in the
various departments and establishments. c
Thus, Initially, the Bureau of the Budget was without
statutory powers in the area of accounting responsibilities. This
situation prevailed for over twenty years. It was not until
President Roosevelt issued on August 13, 19^0, Executive Order
8512, under the authority of the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921, that the Bureau assumed part of the res oons ibillty for the
development of accounting systems and the necessary reports needed
for effective control over the fiscal and budgetary administration
of the government.
However, prior to 19^0, President Hoover attempted to
place accounting and reporting functions in the Bureau of the
26Title III, hZ Stat. 20.
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Budget. On December 9, 1932, based on the authority of the
Economy Act, ' he issued Executive Order 5959i which recommended
that the powers and duties exercised by the General Accounting
Office which relate to the designing, prescribing, and Installation
of accounting forms, systems, and procedures used in the executive
departments and independent establishments be transferred to the
Bureau of the Budget.
President Hoover's reason for this recommendation was
stated as follows:
It is not, however, a proper function of an estab-
lishment created primarily for the purpose of auditing
Government accounts to make necessary studies and to
develop and prescribe accounting systems involving the
entire field of Government accounting* Neither is it a
proper function of such an establishment to prescribe
the procedure for nor to determine the effectiveness of
the administrative examination of accounts. Accounting
is an essential element of effective administration, and
it should be developed with the primary objective of
serving this purpose. *°
The recommendation as submitted by President Hoover was
29disapproved by resolution of the Congress on January 19, 1933*
As mentioned previously, Executive Order 8512, issued by
President Roosevelt in 19^0, was the first real step in developing
accounting procedures necessary for effective administration of
financial matters in the federal government. This order provides
that the Secretary of the Treasury should prepare and transmit to
the Bureau of the Budget such financial reports as may be
27Supra . p. 2?.
~ U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Document
483, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 70.
^Financial Management in the Federal Government .
op. cit. . p. 12.
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necessary to make known the financial condition of the government,
and such other reports as may be required by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget. In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury
was authorized to establish and maintain such accounting records
as necessary to compile such reports. In this regard, Executive
Order 9034, issued on March 3, 1942, amended Executive Order 8512
in that prior to establishing uniform terminology, classifications,
principles, and standards for accounting, they be referred to the
Comptroller General to avoid conflicts of purpose.^
This step brought about one of the objectives political
scientists and experts in governmental affairs had been advocating
for many years; namely, that management should be given the
necessary tools with which to operate, and by giving the President
such authority, he could exercise It through the Bureau of the
Budget, and thereby manage the affairs of government more
effectively.^ 1
The first statutory authority fixing accounting responsi-
bilities in the Bureau of the Budget came as a result of the
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. As has already
been mentioned, the provisions of this Act for the most part
resulted from the recommendations of the first Hoover Commission.
The Commission emphasized the importance of accounting to mainten-
ance of financial integrity and pointed out that accounting not
only provides the basis for summary financial reports by which
3° Ibld
. pp. 20-21.
31lbld.

the executive branch accounts to Congress, but also In the
finality provided for fixing responsibility in the disposition of
government funds.
^
2
The provisions of the Act of 1950 provided for a joint
accounting program to be conducted by the Comotroller General of
the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget with a t1«m toward conducting a con-
tinuous program for the improvement of accounting and financial
reporting in the government. ^3 in addition, the Act gave statutory
effect to Executive Orders 3512 and 903*1 issued by President
Roosevelt in 1940.^
The next step that strengthened the accounting and report-
ing responsibilities of the Bureau of the Budget came as result
of recommendations by the second Hoover Commission. The Commission
noted in its report that the stimulus of central accounting
direction in the executive branch itself is needed if management
is to furnish the financial information *?hich it requires. The
report criticized the Bureau of the Budget for not giving suffi-
cient recognition to its responsibilities for furthering adequate
accounting and financial methods in the executive agencif .
Therefore, in order to meet the accounting responsibilities of
the Bureau of the Budget, the Commission recommended that a staff
office headed by an Assistant Director for Accounting be
-^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Report . 1949, p. 36.
^Section 111, 64 Stof. 832.
^Ibld
.
Section 114.
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established under the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
**
Upon the President's approval of this recommendation, the Bureau
in 1956 added to its four offices an Office of Accounting.
The Office of Accounting provides the Initiative for
improvement of financial management in the executive branch of
the government. It serves as the Director's representative to
the Joint Program for Improvement of Accounting in the federal
government, carried out cooperatively by the General Accounting
Office, the Department of the Treasury, and the Bureau of the
Budget. It conducts programs and activities to solve accounting
problems and to develop effective financial management practices
in the agencies. It also provides information to Congressional
committees concerned with the development of accounting, and gives
guidance and assistance to the divisions in its field.
Legislative Analysis
and Review
Next to budget preparation, the oldest function of the
Bureau of the Budget is the processing of legislation. This
activity of the Bureau had its beginning about five months after
the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. On
November 17, 1921, while the first executive budget was still
being prepared, General Dawes received a letter from Chairman
Kadden, House Appropriations Committee, calling his attention to
two Senate Joint Eesolutions. These Resolutions would have
•^U. S., Congress, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, Report. Budgeting and
Accounting
.
84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1955, pp. 30-31.

authorized the War Department to divert funds to purposes other
than those for which originally appropriated. Mr. Madden was of
the opinion that:
It seems to me that matters of this character should
come through the Bureau of the Budget. ' hile they do
not call for the appropriation of new money, they do
call for the diversion of funds appropriated for a
specific purpose to another purpose, which in effect is
another way of making the appropriation. If this
practice is allowed to grow we will be flooded with
requests of this character and the Bureau of the Budget
will not be cognizant of what is going on until the
matter comes up in Congress. 3°
In response to Mr. Madden' s letter, General Dawes issued
Bureau of the Budget Circular ^9 on December 19, 1921, over his
signature "by direction of the President." The circular cited
as basic authority Section 206 of the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921, which prohibited the submission of appropriation requests,
"to Congress or any committee thereof by any officer or employee
of any department or establishment, unless at the request of either
House of Congress." In addition, the circular required that all
agency proposals for legislation or expression of views on pending
legislation, "the effect of which would be to create a charge
upon the public treasury or commit the government to obligations
which would later require appropriations," be first submitted to
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Shortly after its initial adoption, the legislative
clearance procedure was modified so that a department or agency
head could take major legislative proposals to the President
^ U. S., Bureau of the Budget, Legislation File No. 1
as cited in Donald A. Hansen, "Legislative Clearance By The
Bureau of the Budget," (unpublished Work, April 19^3 )
•
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personally without reference to the Budget Bureau at all except
through an after-the-fact notification required for Bureau
information. It seems that the full impact of the requirements
of the circular were not fully realized at the time of issuanc .
Broadly, or even narrowly interpreted it meant that all proposals
must be cleared by the Budget Bureau, which it appeared, was not
what the President wanted. The Circular was never officially
modified; however, the Budget; Director was taken out of the stream
of most major proposals. Actually, under the Harding administra-
tion, the Bureau apparently was content to undertake whatever
clearances the several departments and agencies chose to submit,
on the basis of their individual interpretation of the circular.
These varied widely. 37
For the next ten years this situation, more or less,
remained substantially the same, depending upon the desires of
the President. During the Coolidge administration, the Budget
Bureau did not have to concern itself with the substantive merits
of a proposal, but merely with its financial results as they
affected the President's planned budget program. ^ L President
Hoover wanted the Budget Bureau to take no action on departmental
requests for clearance unless and until it received a clear
intimation of Congressional interest. •"
-^'Richard Elliott Neustadt, "Presidential Clearance
of Legislation," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of
Political Economy and Government, Harvard University, June 1950),
pp. 22-28.
38Ibld
. p. 37.
39Ibid, p. 40.
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Legislation clearance and coordination as it is now known
had its beginning during President Roosevelt's tenure of office
when he established the National Emergency Council. ° By Bureau
of the Budget Circular No. 336, issued on December 21, 1935,
encies were instructed to clear all bills "solely concerning
fiscal matters" through the Bureau of the Budget. Other proposals
"solely concerning policy matters" were to be submitted to the
Executive Director of the Council for Clearance with the President.
In the fall of 1937* all clearance authority on legislation whioh
had been vested in the National Security Council was rescinded
by Bureau Circular No. 3^ issued on November 15, 1937* Hence-
forth the Bureau was not only to clear all proposals, reports, and
testimony for Congressional hearings but was also to be held com-
pletely responsible for ascertaining the position of executive
agencies with reference to the President's program. *•
At the same time that the routine clearance process for
proposed legislation was taking shape, another important duty
of the Bureau, action on enrolled bills was slowly evolving.
Before the Bureau of the Budget was established, enrollments were
always forwarded to the White House Executive Clerk who would have
the bill referred to appropriate officials by the President's
personal staff. Pertinent materials so assembled were made
available to the President for his consideration. ^
The Council was organized in 1933 • It was intended to
be a device for top-level policy and program coordination. Its
Staff reported directly to* the President. In 193^ and 1935 the
Council held bimonthly meetings with the President. Thereafter
it gradually went into disuse. In 1939, its Staff and functions
were transferred elsewhere.
^•Hobbs, op, clt. . p. 58.
Ibid,.

^7
The development of the enrolled bill clearance process
Is best described by Mr. Richard Neustadt, a leading authority on
legislative clearances.
Shortly after Its establishment in 1921, the Budget
Bureau for obvious reasons, began to get White House
requests for recommendations on all enrolled appropriation
bills. In 193^, it received all private relief bills
involving an expenditure of funds. During the following
three years an increasing share of substantive bills
B sent to the Bureau, which took over the job of cir-
cularizing the departments returning their recommendations
to the White House together with its own. By 1932 almost
all bills were being turned over to the Bureau for this
handling. The few exceptions do not follow any clear
line of demarcation. For all practical purposes, White
House delegation became complete in the second session of
the 76th Congress. 4-*
The Increase In activity by the Bureau in regard to
enrolled legislation had scarcely gotten under way when the United
States entered a period of national emergency followed by the war
years. Consequently, other devices were created, under the
stresses of war, which resulted in this function being split to
a certain extent among the white House staff, the Bureau of the
Budget, and in the later war years, the Office of War Mobilization
and Reconversions. After the war and President Roosevelt's death,
the entire function was put back into the Bureau of the Budget
by President Truman.w
In the fall of 19^7, the Budget Bureau began to play a
new role in its legislative activities. The newly appointed
Budget Director, Mr. James ''ebb, was able to sell himself and
his staff services to President Truman. Thus, he was able to draw
•^Neustadt' s notes as cited in Hobbs , op. cit. , p. 53.
^uJ. S., Congress, House, Committee on Lobbying Activities,
Hearings. The Role of Lobbying in Representative Self-Government a .
Part I
,
81st. Cong., 2ndSess., 1950, p. 135.
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the Budget Bureau closer to '< rhite House affairs. The impact of
this relationship between the President and the Director had a
revolutionary effect upon the role of the legislative operations
of the Bureau. As Mr. Neustadt describes this transition,
. . . "ebb turned to his machinery for legislative
clearance and coordination as a means of focusing agency
and Bureau efforts to help meet the President's needs.
Legislative clearance had had a negative focus. It was
to me made positive. It had interpreted policy and
programs where it found them. It was to help create
them. The operation had not been sensitized to Congres-
sional developments and tactical requirements. It was
to become so. The Bureau as a staff group had not
previously assisted in the preparation of Presidential
messages—except the Budget Messages— or been alerted
to the interplay of forces underlying the formal proposals
which the President set forth. The staff could now
participate as a party at interest or at least stand by
as a friend in court, acquiring background on the program
decisions which it would be called on later to interpret.
Finally, the processes of legislative clearance were to
be adapted so that their production—whether for the
President or the agencies—would represent not merely the
work of the Bureau, but the combined judgement of all
parts of the President's staff. ^5
To round out the Bureau 1 s role in regard to legislative
clearance activities, President Truman on February 9, 19^8, Issued
Executive Order 10006. This order provides for Bureau clearance
for the President of Executive Orders and proclamations.
The only real piece of legislative authority for the
Bureau's functions in regard to legislative clearance, is the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The remainder of the Bureau's
authority is derived from the President. In addition to those
items which originate in the executive branch, the Bureau handles
a heavy volumn of requests from the Congress for expression of
^Neustadt 's notes as cited in Hobbs , op. clt
.
. p. 60.
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view with respect to legislation. Also received, are formal
requests from committee chairmen for an expression of Presidential
opinion on legislation.
The work of the Bureau of the Budget in carrying out the
functions of legislative clearance is performed by the Office of
Legislative Reference. This office coordinates the review by the
Bureau of department and agency proposals for legislation and
agency views on pending legislation and enrolled bills, proposed
executive orders, proclamations, and other formal papers and
documents. The Office participates in the development of the
President's legislative program and informs Congressional com-
mittees and federal agencies about the relationship of proposed
or pending legislation to the Presidents program. It makes
recommendations to the President on legislative proposals and
enrolled bills; maintains liaison with the Congress and the fcfhlte
House on legislation pending before substantive committees; and
coordinates the preparation of testimony by Bureau officials on
legislative matters.
Coordination and Improvement
of Federal Statistics
Attempts to coordinate statistics in the federal govern-
ment go back to at least 1908. In that year President Theodore
Roosevelt set up an Interdepartment Statistical Committee, which
made a brief investigation, filed a report, and disappeared.
Another attempt was made in 1918, when a Central Bureau of
Planning and Statistics, under the War Industries Board, was
created. This Bureau had a brief and active existence, assembling
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statistics, advising other statistical agencies, and serving as a
clearing house of statistical information. Shortly after Vorld
\'ar I, In 1919, it was absorbed by the Bureau of Efficiency.
In 1922, the Bureau of Efficiency proposed, as a permanent
office, a Bureau of Federal Statistics within which the collection,
tabulation and dissemination of all non-administrative statistics
would have been centralized, so far as practicable. The proposal
was offered as a means of achieving coordinated and unified statis-
tics. It aroused so much opposition that the Bureau was never
established. Following this proposal, interest lagged and very
47little was done during the remainder of the 1920' s.
Events such as these resulted in a general concensus that
centralization of statistical services were impractical but a
coordinating agency was necessary. The steps taken since have
been directed toward the twin premises of decentralized operation
48
and central coordination of statistical services.
It was in the year 1931, that the Bureau of the Budget
first became involved in the attempts to coordinate statistics
on a national level. In April of that year, the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget acting "By direction of the President,"
issued Budget Circular No. 293, establishing the Federal
Statistical Board, as a part of the Federal Coordinating Service.
46
U. S., Congress, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (1947-1949), "The Statistical
Agencies of the Federal Government," Report by the National Bureau
of Economic Research, Vol. II, pp. 69-73.
^7Ibid .
^°Clem C. Linnenberg, Jr. "The Development of Federal
Statistical Coordination, 1908-1949," American Statistician
(April-May 1949), o. 7.
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The Board was to deal with a very broad area—statistics throughout
the federal government. However, It was given neither staff nor
powers and did not achieve a great deal. 7 In fact, by the time
it had collected the information that it needed for coordinatlng
,
it was replaced by the Central Statistical Board in 1933-
The Central Statistical Board was established on July 27,
1933 by Executive Order No. 6225, issued under a temporary law
—
the National Industrial Recovery Act. This new Board was a marked
advance over the previous efforts to develop statistical collecting
methods and in 1935 it was recognized by Congress and given
51
specific statutory powers. This was accomplished by Public
Law 219 of July 1935.
Empowered with authority to require information-gathering
agencies to listen to its advice, the Central Statistical Board
was to operate for five years on a trial run basis. At the request
of the President a comprehensive survey was undertaken of finan-
cial and other statistical reports, questionnaires, forms and
other returns made by the public to the federal government.-*
On December 31, 1938, its findings" were reported to the
President. The Board found: (1) that during fiscal year 1938,
eighty-eight agencies collected a total of ninety-seven and one-half
^9Ibid , p. 8.
^ National Bureau of Economic Research Report, loc. clt.
^Linnenberg, op. clt. . p. 8.
* 2Hobbs, op. cit. . p. kZ,
53u. S., Congress, House Document 277, Report of the
Central Statistical Board on the "Returns Made by the Public to
the Federal Government," 76th Cong., 1939, op. ^-6.
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million administrative and thirty-eight million non-administrative
forms, (2) the Board recommended the continuation of decentralized
fact-g; thering units, and (3) stress was placed on the need for
a central body which would standardize and correlate forms sent
out to the public.
Since the task of coordinating statistical services was
considered such an integral part of the general program of
achieving economy and efficiency in the federal "overnment-^ that,
in 1939, under the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1, the
Central Statistical Board was transferred to the Bureau of the
Budget. Initially, the Board operated as a separate and quasi-
independent unit within the Bureau, •hen its five-year term
lapsed in 19^3, it became an integral part of the Bureau of the
Budget. -5-5
Legislation up to this point gave the coordinating agency
only authority to examine reports and records of the statistical
agencies, but none to enforce its recommendations. In order to
alleviate this situation, the Federal Reports Act of 19^2, put
teeth into the work of the statistical coordinating division in
the Bureau of the Budget. This Act gives the Budget Bureau five
principal powers: to forbid most of the federal agencies to collect
information on incidental items; to appoint a single collection
agency wherever it finds more than one agency of the federal
government collecting substantially the same statistical
5^
Wilkie, op. clt. , p. 297.
-^Hobbs, loc. clt.
°U. S., Congress, Federal Reports Act . Public Law 331,
7?th Cong., 2nd 3essT, 19^2.
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information; to decide whether data are necessary and forbid
agencies to collect information which is not; to make any agency
turn the data it has already collected over to other federal
agenoies, provided the original responding business firms give
permission; and to issue regualtions which will carry out the
provisions of the Act. The Federal Reports Act exempts from the
jurisdiction of the Budget Bureau most agencies in the Department
of the Treasury."
On February 8, 19^9, Executive Order 10033 *aa Issued.
It required the approval by the Director of the Budget Bureau of
responses by federal agencies to official statistical inquiries
from international organizations. The legal basis for the
issuance of this order is found in Section 8 of the Bretton -oods
Agreement Act-' and the presidential powers as enumerated in the
Constitution. *?
In 1950, as a result of several recommendations made by
the First Hoover Commission, further legislation was passed
by the Congress strengthening the statutory basis of the Bureau's
work in federal statistics. Section 103 of this piece of legis-
lation provides that:
The President, through the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, is authorized and directed to develop programs
57
"The exemptions are the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Comptroller of the Currency, Bureau of the Public Dept., Bureau
of Accounts, Division of Foreign Fund Control.
5859 Stat. 515.
59U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
pe ra t i oris
,
Executive Orders and Proclamations: A Study of a
Use of Presidential Powers . 35th Con?.. 1st Sess.. 1957.
60Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Report
. 19 ;-+9, p. 31.
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and to issue regulations and orders for the improved
gatheringi compiling, analyzing, publishing, and dissem-
inating of statistical information for any purpose by
the various agencies in the executive branch of the
Government. Suoh regulations and orders shall be adhered
to by such agencies •'**
Executive Order 10253 of June 11, 1951, delegates to the
Director the authority given to the President in Section 103 of
the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1953 to develop
programs and to issue orders and regulations concerning gathering,
analyzing, and disseminating statistical information.
In summary, the Bureau of the Budget derives its legal
powers fcr the coordination and Improvement of federal statistics
mainly from the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Executive
Order 824'-8 of September 3, 1939, the Federal Reports Act of 19^2,
and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. The function
is rounded out by several Executive Orders Issued principally as
a result of statutory powers granted the President by the Congress.
The Office of Statistical Standards exercises the Bureau's
function with respect to the government's statistical activities.
In carrying out this function, it eliminates duplication in the
collection of Information and minimizes reporting burdens on the
public by review and clearance of statistical forms and question-
naires proposed by federal agencies; It develops and applies
Improved statistical techniques and standard definitions and
classifications; it maintains surveillance over the publication of
statistical data from the standpoint of national security; snd it
serves as the focal point for United States participation in the
statistical activities of international activities.
'Hh Stat. 832.
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Other Functions
In addition to the so-called main functions mentioned
thus far in this chapter, the Bureau performs many additional
tasks. Many of these activities were specifically assigned to
the Bureau by statutory authority, while many others were assigned
by executive order backed up for the most part by legislative
authority.
A few of the principal laws relating to the Bureau, other
than those already discussed are: The Travel Expense Act of
62
19^9, ' which authorized the Director of the Bureau to issue
regulations with respect to travel allowances; the Act of July
63
15, 1954, which granted the Director the authority to approve
agency regulations on the collection of amounts erroneously paid
to Government employees; in the Act of September 1, 1954, ^ which
specifically charged the Budget Director with the duty to promul-
gate rules and regulations about the administration of uniform
allowances; and in the Congressional Resolution of May 11, 1922,
under which the use of appropriations for the printing and binding
of periodicals is subject to Bureau approval. Nearly all of
these additional legislative authorizations rounding out the
Budget and Accounting Act were conferred upon the Bureau of the
Budget after its transfer to the Executive Office of the President.
A complete annotated listing of the principal laws relating to
the Bureau of the Budget is contained in Appendix B.
The framework of legislative authorization for the Bureau
is filled in by executive orders. A fev; illustrations of
6263 Stat. 166. 63 68 Stat. 482. 6/f68 Stat. 1114.
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elaboration by executive order of the Bureau's coordinating and
reviewing activities are Executive v)rder 909*4 of March 10, 19*4-2,
which abolished the Board of Surveys and Maps and directed the
Bureau to coordinate and plan federal mapping and chart-making
functions, and Executive Order 938*4- of October *4, 19*4-3, which
made it a function of the Bureau to review federal public works
and Improvement projects and preparation of lon^-range plans with
respect to such projects.
Other illustrations are Executive Order 10530 of May 10,
195*4, which delegates to the Director of the Budget Bureau the
exercise of statutory authorities of the President involving
(a) transfers of balances of appropriations, (b) interagency land
transfers, land acquisition, and (c) regulatory functions with
respect to travel, transportation of household goods, and similar
matters; Executive Order 10579 of November 30, 195*4-, which
requires the Director to make a final decision on appeal by an
agency from any determination by the Administration of General
Services with respect to the establishment of an interagency motor
vehicle pool or system; Executive Order 10729 of September 16,
1957 i which makes it a duty of the Bureau to collaborate with the
Special Assistant to the President on Personnel Management in the
improvement of personal management throughout the federal govern-
ment; and Executive Order 10766 of May 1, 1958, which delegates
to the Director the President's authority to approve regulations
on the rental of substandard housing for members of the uniformed
services. A complete annotated list of principle executive orders
pertaining to the Bureau of the Budget is contained in Appendix C.
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In addition to the functions delegated by statutory
authority and executive orders, oth r tasks have been assigned
to the Bureau of the Budget by presidential request or as a result
of the practical working experience of the Bureau. ^ For instance,
the Bureau has the job of scheduling ^overn-nent office hours and
by request of President Truman, the Bureau established a federal
history program.
°^U. S», Executive Office of the President, Bureau of
the Budget, Staff Orientation Manual , April 1953, p, tk
*

CHAPTER IV
BUREAU RELATIONSHIPS
The President
Since the principal job of the President is to make
decisions, he must carefully choose among the many alternative
proposals which come to his office. Basically, he has a set of
objectives, expressed in laws or in the broad goals of his admin-
istration. Against this background, he must select the means
through which these objectives can best be attained. To assist
the President in making these decisions is the primary task of
the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau serves him by testing each
new proposal, questioning its assumptions, Judging Its probable
effectiveness, matching it on its merits against alternatives,
appraising its timing, measuring how thoroughly it has been
thought through, considering it in the context of its place in a
free enterprise economy, and balancing its initial and ultimate
1
cost against the expected results.
Naturally, the President has other sources of help to
assist him in the decision making process besides the Bureau of
the Budget. However, the other staff agencies in the Office of
the President such as the Council of Economic Advisors and the
Maurice H. Stans, "Responsibilities of the Bureau of
the Budget," Federal Accountant (Sept. 1959)
,
pp. 15-16.
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National Security Council are, for the most part, too specialized
to provide help on an across-the-board basis. Also, the individ-
uals on the White House Staff itself, however gifted personally,
stand alone without support of special staffs of their own and
2
are primarily concerned with domestic political policies. In
regard to the cabinet officers, no matter how loyal they are to
the President, they tend naturally to plead the special views
worked up by their departmental staffs. Thus, the Bureau of the
Budget, being widely informed with its over-all view of the
government, stands ready and able to assist the President on an
across-the-board basis. In fact, this is one of the main reasons
why the Bureau was initially created in 1921, to provide the
President with a centralized office to investigate, collect
information, and assist him in the performance of his executive
duties.-' Stated another way, the Bureau is the means by which
the President is able to strengthen his position as the Chief
Executive.
As has been mentioned on many occasions throughout this
paper, the fundamental authorizations for delegation of authority
to the Director of the Budget are contained in Title II of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Also, the Bureau of the Budget
itself was created by Section 20? of the Act, which in addition
authorized the President to appoint a director and an assistant
director without the usual advise and consent of the Senate.
Donald Q. Gumz, "The Bureau of the Budget and Defense
Fiscal Policy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings
(April, 1959), p. 87.
3Supra
. pp. 3-4.

60
However, all the authorities contained in Title II are conferred
upon the President, who wa« to be responsible for the formulation,
presentation, and execution of the budget of the United States.
The Director nets only "under such rules and regulations as the
President may prescribe" or "when directed by the President."
Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the Bureau's
relations with the President depend, for the most part, on the
personal relationship between the Director of the Budget Bureau
and the President. The Director is often referred to as the
"President's man."
Each President must decide how he wants to use the Bureau.
He can employ the Bureau mainly to keep a lid on expenditures.
The Bureau, in such cases, is told to "hold the line"—but may be
given little guidance concerning the President's priorities and
program goals. In coordinating and auditing executive branch
performance, less reliance is placed on the Bureau and more on
interdepartmental coordinating mechanisms or ; ?hite House aides.
Thus, in such a situation, the Bureau becomes a kind of "Certified
Presidential Accounting Office."
On the other hand, a President can employ the Bureau as
his "lengthened shadow"-' across the entire front of fiscal policy
and program management. The Budget Director in this type of role
belongs to the innermost policy councils of the President. The
President in these instances regards the Bureau as his strong right
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Study. The Bureau of the Budget and the Budgetary
Process, 37th Cong., 1st 3ess., 1961, p. 2.
5 lb id.
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arm in executive management. To attain this position, the Budget
Director must first gain the complete confidence of the President.
Employed with sophistication, the Bureau of the Budget
through the budgetary process can be the Presidents most discrim-
inating and effective tool in controlling the agencies in the exec-
utive branch. In this respect, the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget historically has never been able to stabilize for any length
of time, the power equation between himself and others in relation
to the President. Dawes ranked on a plane v^ith, or perhaps out-
ranked Cabinet officials, for he was allowed to issue budget orders
to any official regardless of rank.? Lord and Hoop preferred not
to buck heads with Cabinet officials. Other Directors throughout
the years gained policy victories over Cabinet heads, while others
did not fare as well. However, the Director's influence over the
President is always something to be feared by department heads,
for he serves as the keeper of the presidential conscience, and
his instinctive habit of saying "no" may often counter the
presidential bias toward saying "yes. "9
A director who has the confidence of the President is
strategically located for exercising influences which go beyond
strictly his money and staff advisory roles. For with the aid of
his Bureau, the Director applies the broad policies approved by
the President. In the application of these policies, the Director
°Edward H. Hobbs, Behind The President (Washington, D. C:
Public Affairs Press, 195^), P» 31.
Supra, p. 22.
Supra, p. 26.
%obbs, loc. cit.
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makes decisions with, respeot to the substance of the programs
involved. He also plays an important role in evaluating, and
initiating broad alternative policies in presenting them to the
President. Thus, the Director is, in effect, performing a
decision-making function. In this respect, the decisions made
which cannot be personally viewed by the President are transmitted
directly to line agencies. This places the Bureau in position
which is more than a "staff agency" as defined by Koontz and
0" Donne ll. 11
The decision-making role of the Bureau with respect to
the President has come under some sharp criticism throughout its
existence. The question that is often raised is whether the
advisor is not in fact the Presidents "alter ego," one who makes
decisions for him. In this regard, the Director, on occasion,
has been referred to as the most powerful man in Washington
—
except, of course, for the President. -^
The Congress
The Budget and Accounting Act made the Bureau of the
Budget definitely a part of the executive branch, but it was also
envisioned as a fiscal aid to the Congress. The law clearly
prescribes that "the Bureau shall, at the request of any Committee
10
Norman M. Pearson, "Tlie Budget Bureau: From Routine
Business to General Staff," Public Administrative Review
(Spring, 19^3), p- 130.
i:LHarold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of
Management (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959), p. 135.
12Edward L. Katzenbach, "Bubud's Defense Policy," The
Reporter (June, I960), p. 26.
13 Ibld . P . 25.
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of either House of Congress having jurisdiction over revenue or
appropriations, furnish the Committee such aid and information
as it may request." 1 It is apparent from the organization of the
Bureau of the Budget as well as from this language that it was
not meant to be an advisory agency to the Congress in the same
manner in which it advises the President. Also Congress does
not have as direct control over the Budget Bureau as it does over
the General Accounting Office. Furthermore, the initiative must
come from Congress in requesting aid and information. Congress,
moreover, is not restricted to the information received from the
Bureau of the Budget, as it may obtain as much as it desires from
the departments and agencies.
It is interesting to note that both the revenue and
appropriation committees are included. In this respect, the
Bureau has rarely been called upon for assistance by the non-
finance centered committees, although certain administrative
studies have been undertaken at the behest of Congressional
Committees, such as the one on administrative promotions for
federal employees and one on the expense of personnel work. '
The Bureau has encouraged such studies, but few have resulted
from Congressional inspiration.
General Dawes, while serving as the first Budget Director,
made it clear that the Budget Bureau was advisory to Congress
only on matters of routine business, and that the Bureau was to
be "impartial, impersonal and non-political." Although he ur^ed
Supra . p. 16.
^Hobbs, op. clt.
. p. 66.
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the fullest cooperation, it seems generally agreed that until the
reorganization of the Bureau in 1939, very little aid or infor-
mation was furnished to the Congress. However, when the Bureau
began to strengthen its staff after being transferred to the
executive offices, Congress has sought and received advisory
reports.
The relationship between Congress and the Bureau of the
Budget has not always been as smooth as one would like to believe
or as implied in the Budget and Accounting Act. Many controversial
areas have developed throughout the years. However, before dis-
cussing some of the aspects involved, it is important to under-
stand the political forces which surround the Bureau of the Budget
under the direction of the President, and the Congress. An
appropriate summary in this regard is given by Hr« Frederick J.
Lawton, a former Budget Director, who served during the last two
years of the Truman Administration:
The natural pulls and strains that run through a
society of autonomous interest groupings will normally
keep Congress and the President on different tracks.
The basic reason, as I have tried to imply, does not
lie simply in the division of legislative and executive
power. It lies in differences of political persoective-
ness which in turn are influenced by interest relation-
ships. The political perspective of Congress is affected
closely by the perspectiveness of its individual members,
who have their political roots in their districts. The , ~
President's perspective is necessarily national, not local.
'
One of the most controversial of all the functions of
the Bureau is that of enforcing reserves and impounding funds.
^Pearson, op. clt. t pp. 129-130.
17
'Frederick J. Lawton, "Legisla tive-iixecutive
Relationships in Budgeting as Viewed by the Executive," Public
Administrative Review (Spring, 19^3), p. 1?0.
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The legal basis for the impounding of funds when the objective
is to avoid a deficiency in an appropriation is clearly found in
the Anti-Deficiency Law, but when the process goes a step further
and becomes immersed in deciding policy questions as to the actual
requirements of an operating agency when there is little danger of
overobligation, that is a much more dubious proposition. :en
a reserve is established with the purpose of curtailing a partic-
ular program, Congressmen have labeled such action an illegal
transgression of congressional prerogatives. It Is contended that
when the Bureau of the Budget decides on its own that appropria-
tions should not be spent for the purpose prescribed by Congress,
it is in effect usurping the power of Congress to control the
purse.
In defense of the power of the Bureau of the Budget to
take such action, it is contended that appropriations must be
considered not as mandates to spend, but as outside limits within
which the executive branch must operate. The courts have repeat-
edly held that the provision in the Constitution which provides
that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in conse-
quence of appropriations made by law" is a mere limitation on
the spending power of the executive branch and a simple restriction
on those who disburse public funds, and is not a grant of special
power to Congress making it mandatory to soend all funds voted
by Congress. It is further argued that the President has the
constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed," including appropriation acts, and that his determination
13
Hobbs, op. clt. t p. 96
i

66
that times have so changed since the enactment of the appropria-
tion that it is no longer advisable to spend the entire amount or
19
to carry out the contemplated program, is also indisputable.
The issue is still a delicate one as evidenced by the objections
recently voiced by Senator Carl Vinson over tentative curtailment
of the 3-70 program, for which Congress had specifically
appropriated the money.
Another controversial area which exists between the
Bureau of the Budget and the Congress is the Bureau's role in its
legislative clearance activities. The Bureau is authorized to
review not only legislative proposals which originate within the
departments and agencies, it also reviews all enrolled legisla-
tion before submission to the President. Therefore, it is not
very difficult to understand why a Congressman would feel none
too kindly toward the Bureau if the Office of Legislative Reference
returned a negative report on his pet project, designed to butter
21
up the voters back home.
Other Congressmen, recognizing the fact thrt v.hen legis-
lation is vetoed by the President, the veto message is normally
written by the Eureau of the 3udget, insist that the Bureau is
in effect "legislating." In the Bureau's defense in these situ-
ations, Mr. Wllkie contends that such protests reflect a failure
to understand the Bureau in its true role as an advisor to the
^Horace W. iilkie, "Legal Basis For Increased Activities
Of The Federal Budget Bureau," The G-eorr:e Washington Law lievlew
(April, 19^3 )f P. 287.
20
21,
p. k*
Supra, p. 55*
The Washington Star . April 20, 1952, Willian J. Kayer,
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President. He claims that the Bureau has no pow«r to pronounce
22
policy save in the nair.e of the President.
The power of the Bureau of the Budget In influencing
and determining federal programs has evoked such comments and
actions from Congressmen as follows:
Eep. Daniel J. Flood (D Pa.) March 13 introduced
a bill (HR 11419) to abolish the Bureau entirely as
an executive arm of the President. Sen. Mike Fiansfleld
(D Mont.) and Reps. F. Edward Hebert (D La.) , Herbert
Zelenk (D N.Y.) and James Roosevelt (D. Calif.) have
introduced bills to prohibit the Budget Bureau from
withholding or impounding appropriations or from spend-
ing appropriated money for any but the purpose for which
Congress earmarked the money. Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson
(D Texas) has called the agency "a czar" and Flood
has called it "a Frankenstein". Sen. Albert Gore
(D Tenn. ) has cautioned Congress that the Budget Bureau's
operations Indicate a "trend away from representative
government. ,,2->
The above item appeared in the Congressional Quarterly
Fact Sheet during 1958. It is interesting to note that all of
the above comments are coming from Democrats during a Republican
administration. In this respect, it would be interesting to
learn whether or not these same gentlemen, especially Mr. Johnson,
feel the same toward the Bureau of the Budget now that a Democrat
is living in the White House.
Regardless of the feeling of Congressmen toward the
Bureau in regard to its legislative reference activities, they
have learned to respect the weight and muscle of the Bureau's
recommendations. Many Congressmen submit proposed bills to the
Bureau for analysis before introducing them on "the hill."
22
V.'ilkie, oo. cit
.
. p. 290.
'•Budget Bureau Vs Congress," Con ;;resslonal quarterly
Fact Sheet (Meek ending 13 June 1958), p. 7^3-
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It has been customary for the Bureau to stay clear of
Congressional dealings Insofar as testifying before Committees
or working Jointly with Committee staffs is involved. Contacts
established beyond the appropriation staffs have in most cases
been quite formalized. However, there are oases where the Bureau
has worked hand in glove with Congressional Committees. For
example, the Senate Policy Committee started keeping in close
touch with Legislative Reference on the status of pending legis-
lation insofar as administration policy is concerned, and the
House Rules Committee established the habit of checking directly
with the Bureau on nearly all important bills which come before
it. 'These trends may be indicative of even closer relationships
between the Bureau and the Congress; however, before any definite
conclusions can be drawn, one must always remember the political
aspects that are ever present.
The Departments and Agencies
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 revolutionized the
procedures in use at the time by the departments and agencies in
submitting their appropriation requests to the Congress. As we
have seen, prior to the passage of the Act, these establishments
functioned, for the most part, as separate and independent
organizations, each pressing its own special needs upon the
25Congress. However, since 1921, the various factions of the
government were required to submit requests, not only for funds,
but also any proposed legislation to the President through the
oh
Hobbs, op. clt.. p. 66.
2
*Supra, pp. 2-3.
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Bureau of trie Budget for consolidation and review prior to pre-
sentation to the Congress* This procedure was recognized at the
time as good business practice for a rapidly growing national
budget.
Insofar as the establishments were concerned, an extra
layer of review and analysis was interposed between themselves
and the Congress. Instead of jockeying for position and prestige
directly before Congress, they now had to shift their emphasis
to the Bureau of the Budget. This one fact alone would cause a
certain amount of ill-feeling toward the Bureau, especially if a
pet project submitted by an agency was turned down before it even
reached Congressional consideration. This feeling on the part of
the departments and agencies has in some respeots continued to
persist up to the present time.
Much of the attitude of the agencies toward the Bureau
of the 3udget has been more or less of the unofficial variety.
For it must be remembered that the budget and programs as pre-
sented to Congress by the executive branch, represent the official
view of the President and must be defended as such, regardless of
the individual aspirations of the various establishments.
The Bureau on the other hand, in making its contribution
toward the government's pursuit of the common good, endeavors to
guide itself by a unified concept of its functions. Such a concept
calls for a vantage point above the particular interests advanced
by individual agencies; strong determination to give synthesis
to the far-flung governmental activities; full appreciation of
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the importance of an objective approach in the discharge of the
Bureau's functions; and continuing efforts to inspire and sustain
cooperative attitudes on the part of all agencies with which the
26
Bureau has to deal.
As a staff agency, the Bureau of the Budget depends for
much of its effectiveness on the support it receives from those
who exercise directive power—the President on the one side and
the responsible officials of the various levels of the depart-
mental system on the other. In all of these relationships, the
Bureau endeavors to demonstrate its capabilities by gaining
recognition through the weight of constructive and informed
recommendations. ' In this respect, the Bureau in carrying out
its statutory functions or such directives as are given it by the
President, is in a position to insist upon compliance. However,
the Bureau believes that reliance on authority alone is not a
good way to obtain results. Instead, acceptance on their merits
of carefully considered propositions by reasonable officials has
28
a more positive and durable effect. Therefore, to attain willing
acceptance of its determinations and recommendations as a result
of full analysis of each problem before it is one of the Bureau's
foremost goals.
In brief, the departments and agencies are duty bound to
accept the recommendations and proposals as advanced by the
2
°U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the
Budget, Staff Orientation Manual . April 1953, p. 29.
2 ?Ibld .
28Ibld.
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Budget Bureau. This acceptance may not, at times, be as willingly
as the Bureau would like to have it, but nevertheless compliance
for the most part is automatic. Otherwise, the Bureau can force
acceptance by virtue of its powers derived from statutory and
presidential authority.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
One fact which immediately strikes the attention of the
student studying the Bureau of the Budget is the wide range and
breadth of the activities of the agency. These activities have
been developed over a period of four decades and have been derived
from statutory and presidential authority. The majority of the
functions performed by the Bureau are specific in nature; however,
over the years it has served as something of a reviewing agency
of things flowing up to the President from the individual depart-
ments and agencies whenever they do not fit into the assignments
of the other parts of the Executive Office of the President. In
this respect, and because the Bureau is that element of the
President's staff which represents the most diversified source
of technical advice, the Budget Bureau has come to be used by the
President in many matters beyond its direct statutory responsi-
bilities.
This use of the Budget Bureau has angered many Congress-
men. They feel that the Bureau, when used in this manner is
overly dominated by the President and therefore are leary of
Congressional instruction. However, it must be remembered that
Edward H. Hobbs , Behind the President (Washington, B.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 195*0, p. 68.
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the Budget and Accounting Act established the Bureau as a staff
agency of the President, Its only direct responsibility to
Congress is to furnish such aid and information as may be requested*
It is only natural that such aid and information which is requested
and furnished reflect the current administration's views, for
the Director is the "President's man."
The Budget and Accounting Act also provides that the
Director will carry out his duties only "under such rules and
regulations as the President may prescribe" or "when directed by
the President." Nothing in the Act specified that these delega-
tions of authority from the President to the Director hed to be
by letter or executive order. As a consequence, the actions of
the Director, arid in turn the Bureau, have been based largely
upon the informal understanding between him and the President
and upon implied authority of the Budget and Accounting Act. The
President's actions are based upon the Presidential powers imbued
in the Constitution and related laws. Thus, the actions of the
Bureau are firmly entrenched in legal authority.
Any staff agency which stands astride as many powerful
operating agencies and their ambitions as does the Bureau of the
Budget is bound to draw some very caustic criticism. Inevitably,
in every kind of organization, in or out of government, the
individual or unit which plays an active part in guiding the
decisions that are taken on financial matters usually will take
last place in a popularity contest. This is true of the controller
in a private business or in any other similar organization. The
Bureau of the Budget in its role of advisor to the President on

7k
all financial matters of the government is no exception. From all
indications the Bureau has learned to shoulder criticism of its
actions with an attitude of indifference. And why shouldn't it,
with the President solidly behind it.
In this regard, there is no doubt as to where the present
Budget Director stands in relation to the present administration.
President Kennedy in paying tribute to the Bureau on its fortieth
birthday said:
The objectivity and deep knowledge of the process of
government of the Bureau's staff have made it a highly
valued part of the President's Executive Office. One
President is said to have called the Bureau 'his good
right arm.' I should like to second that motion. The
work of the President would be very difficult indeed
without the staff support of the Budget Bureau. 2
2Sidney Hyman, "Our Head Budgeteer: A Close-in View,"
New York Times Magazine . August 20, 1961, p. 3.

APPENDIX A
i:ain functions of the bureau of the budget as defined in
executive order no. 8248 of september 8, 1939
To assist the President in the preparation of the budget
and the formulation of the fiscal program of the Government.
To supervise and control the administration of the budget.
To conduct research in the development of improved plans
of administrative management, and to advise the executive depart-
ments and agencies of the Government with respect to improved
inistrative organization and practice.
iO aid the President to bring about more efficient and
economical conduct of Government service.
To assist the President by clearing and coordinating
departmental advice on proposed legislation and by making recom-
mendations as to presidential action on legislative enactments,
in accordance with past practice.
To assist in the consideration and clearance and, where
necessary, in the preparation of proposed Executive orders and
proclamations, in accordance with the provisions of Executive
Order 7298 of February 18, 1936 (now Executive Order No. 10006
of October 9, 19'W .
To plan and promote the improvement, development, and
coordination of federal and other statistical services.
To keep the President informed of the progress of activi-
ties by agencies of the Government with respect to work proposed,
work actually initiated, and work completed, together with the
relative timing of work between the several agencies of the
Government; all to the end that the work programs of the several
acies of the executive branch of the Government may be coord-
inated and that the monies appropriated by the Congress may be
expended in the most economical manner possible with the least
possible overlapping and duplication of effort.
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APPENDIX B
INCIPI.E STATUTES RELATING TO THE
BUREAU OP THE BUDGET
(Annotated)
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. (42 Stat. 20; 31 U.S.C. 1-24)
Establishes Bureau of the Budget with primary responsi-
bility for preparing an annual budget and any supplemental
or deficiency estimates.
Reorganization Plan I of 1939. (53 Stat. 1423; 5 U.S.C. 133 t)
Transfers the Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury
Department to the Executive Office of the President.
Functions of the Central Statistical Board and the Central
Statistical Committee transferred to Bureau of the Budget.
Effective date July 1, 193 • (53 Stat. 813; 5 U.S.C. 133s)
Federal Reports Act of 1942. {56 Stat. 1073; 5 U.S.C. 139-139f)
Coordinates Federal reporting and statistical services
to eliminate duplication and reduce cost of such services
and to minimize the burdens of furnishing information to
federal agencies.
Government Corooration Control Act of 1945. (59 Stat. 597;
31 U.S.C. 847, 849, 852)
Authorizes Bureau to review the budgets and programs
of wholly-owned Government corporations.
Classification Act of 1949. (63 Stat. 954; 5 U.S.C. 1151)
Gives the Bureau authority to prescribe regulations
for the systematic review by the deportments of their
operations.
Travel Expense Act of 1949. (63 Stat. 166; 5 U.S.C. 835-842)
Authorizes Bureau to fix rates for travel allowances.
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. (64 Stat. 832;
31 U.S.C. 2, 11, 14, 16, 18a, 18b, 22-24, 65-67 t 581-58lc,
347)
Amplifies the Budget and Accounting Act by clarifying
the Bureau's responsibilities, especially in the fields
of administrative analysis and integration of statistical
work, and by providing a continuous program for the improve-
ment of accounting and financial reporting throughout the
Government.
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Section 3679, Revised Statutes, as amended. (64 Stat. 765;
31 U.S.C. 665)
Prescribes procedures by which the Director apportions
appropriations, provides for agency systems of administrative
control of funds to be approved by him, and authorizes him
to establish reserves in appropriations and funds. Authority
to make such apportionments formerly rested on Executive
Order No. 6166 of June 10, 1933.
Act of July 15, 1954. (68 Stat. 482; 5 U.S.C. 46e)
Confers upon the Director authority to approve agency
regulations dealing with the collection of indebtedness on
the part of Government employees as a result of erroneous
payments made to them.
Federal Employees Uniform Allowances Act. (63 Stat. 1114;
69 Stat. 49; 5 U.S.C. 2133)
Charges the Director with the duty to promulgate rules
and regulations governing the administration of Title IV
of this act, dealing with uniform allowances.
Act of August 1, 1956. (70 Stat. 782; 31 U.S.C. 11, 24, 18c, 66a)
Amends the Budget and Accounting Act and the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act, mainly to improve further govern-
mental budgeting and accounting methods and procedures.
Emphasizes application of principles of accrual accounting
and cost based budgeting.

APPENDIX C
PERTINENT EXECUTIVE ORDERS RELATING TO THE
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
(Annotated)
Executive Order 8248, Sept. 8, 1939.
Specifies the Bureau's functions as part of the Executive
Office of the President.
Executive Order 9094, Mar. 10, 1942.
Abolishes Board of Surveys and Maps and authorizes Bureau
to coordinate and plan federal mapping and chart-making
activities.
Executive Order 9384, Oct. 4, 1943.
Provides for review of federal public works and improve-
ment projects, and preparation of long-range plans with
respect to such projects.
Executive Order 10006, Oct. 9, 1948*
Provides for Bureau clearance for the President of
executive orders and proclamations*
Executive Order 10033* Feb. 8, 1949*
Requires approval of Director for responses by federal
agencies to official statistical inquiries from inter-
governmental organiza tions
.
Executive Order 10072* July 2>, 1949.
Provides for continuing action to improve the manage-
ment of the executive branch, and requires the Director
to assist agencies in planning such programs and to review
their efforts.
Executive Order 10253* June 11, 1951.
Delegates to the Director authority given to President
in Section 103 of the Budget and Accounting Procedures
Act of 1950 to develop programs and to issue orders and
regulations concerning gathering, analyzing, and dissemin-
ating statistical information.
Executive Order 10530, May 10, 1954* Amended by Executive Order
10759, Mar. 17, 1958.
Delegates to the Director the exercise of statutory
authorities of the President involving (1) transfers of
balances of appropriations, (2) interagency land transfers,
land acquisitions, and contracts for land acquisitions,
and (3) regulatory functions with respect to travel, trans-
portation of household goods, and similar matters.
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Executive Order 10559, Sept. 8, 1954.
Delegates to the Director the President's authority to
allocate to agencies funds appropriated to the President for
management improvement.
Executive Order 10560, Sept. 9, 1954. Amended by Executive
Order 10703, May 6, 1957, and Executive Order 10746,
Dec. 12, 1957, and Executive Order 10327, June 25, 1959.
Delegates to the Director the President's authority to
fix amounts of foreign currencies to be used for various
purposes, to waive certain statutory requirements, and to
take related actions.
Executive Order 10579, Nov. 30, 1954.
Requires the Director to make a final decision on appeal
by an agency from any determination by the Administrator
of General Services with respect to the establishment of an
interagency motor vehicle pool or system.
Executive Order 10729, Sept. 16, 1957.
Makes it a duty of the Bureau to collaborate with the
Special Assistant to the President for Personnel Management
in the improvement of personnel management throughout the
federal government.
Executive Order 10766, May 1, 1958.
Delegates to the Director the President's authority to
approve regulations on the rental of substandard housii:
for members of the uniformed services.
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